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The Executive holds the sword . . . the Legislature commands the purse. 
The Judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over the sword or the purse. 
 
      —Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 78 
	   ii	  
 
 




List of Tables  







CHAPTER 1: FEDERAL JUDGES’ BUDGETARY POWERS  
 
CHAPTER 2: PULLING THE PURSE STRINGS:  AN INFORMATION THEORY OF CRISIS 
JURISPRUDENCE 
 
CHAPTER 3: MOBILIZING JUDICIAL RESOURCES:  THE INFORMATION THEORY IN ACTION 
 
CHAPTER 4: THE JUDICIAL UNDERSTANDING OF COSTLY FOREIGN POLICY EVENTS 
 










	   1	  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Two months before Germany surrendered, six months before the U.S. dropped atomic 
bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and well before Congress repealed the World War II revenue 
laws, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the case Commissioner v. Court Holding 
Co.1  This 1945 controversy involved a three-way property transaction in which the Court 
Holding Company distributed real estate to its shareholders as a dividend, who then immediately 
sold the property to a pre-determined third party.  The evidence unambiguously indicated that the 
shareholders were involved in the deal for one reason: to enable Court Holding to avoid the 
status of seller, thereby steering clear of the high federal taxes imposed on the sale of corporate 
assets.  Justice Black, writing for a unanimous Court, held in favor of the government noting that 
“[t]o permit the true nature of a transaction to be disguised by mere formalisms which exist 
solely to alter tax liabilities would seriously impair the effective administration of the tax policies 
of Congress.”2   
Four years later, in 1949, and six months before North Korea’s surprise attack on the 
Republic of South Korea, the Court heard oral arguments in U.S. v. Cumberland, a case that 
involved remarkably similar facts to those in Court Holding.3  A corporation, its shareholders, 
and a third party engaged in a three-way property transaction undertaken to enable the 
Cumberland Public Service Company to sell its property while avoiding the negative tax 
consequences associated with the sale of corporate-owned assets.  Justice Black, again writing 
for a unanimous Court,4 noted the transaction looked “shadowy and artificial” but this time 
rendered a decision in favor of the taxpayer, thereby allowing Cumberland to avoid paying taxes.  
The Court acknowledged the “oddities in [the] tax consequences,” but justified the decision on 
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the grounds that Congress had not enacted legislation specifically barring the use of shareholders 
as conduits to evade corporate taxes, and, moreover, the lower court tribunals had, themselves, 
reached a pro-government result in Court Holding and one that favored the taxpayer in 
Cumberland. 
 Scholars, courts, and commentators have attempted to reconcile the two cases but 
conventional wisdom holds that the Supreme Court did nothing more than foster confusion and 
incoherence in an important area of the law.  After all, the two cases involved identical legal 
provisions and virtually identical facts and circumstances, yet the justices unanimously agreed to 
issue divergent outcomes.  Moreover, changes on the bench in the interim period were minimal: 
the Court had eight Democratic-appointees in 1945 and nine Democratic-appointees in 1949.  In 
short, while the justices decided Cumberland in order to “clear up doubts arising out of the Court 
Holding Company case,” they seemed to do just the opposite. 
This book argues that while Court Holding and Cumberland appear confusing and 
irreconcilable on their face, the cases are in fact wholly predicable if important factors are taken 
into account, namely the existence of wartime conditions.  The justices considered Court 
Holding at a time when the U.S. was fighting major wars against enemy states on several fronts, 
but Cumberland emerged after World War II had dissolved into peacetime.  Why would wartime 
emergencies cause Supreme Court justices to transform their decision-making calculus in a 
manner that appears to favor the government in the taxation cases that end up on the Court’s 
dockets?  Because in the words of President Roosevelt, and quoted by the Court, itself:  “[w]ar 
cost money.”5  In light of the massive and unavoidable financial costs that emerge in times of 
foreign policy crises, the justices have suggested in various ways and in various cases that “[i]n 
total war, it is necessary that a civilian make sacrifices of his property and profits with at least 
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the same fortitude as that with which a drafted soldier makes his traditional sacrifices of comfort, 
security and life itself.”6 Indeed, the Court has gone so far as to suggest that it has a role to play 
in raising the revenue necessary to meet the nation’s wartime needs.  In a dispute involving 
World War II taxes, the justices noted, the country was “faced with revenue needs and a tax 
program of a magnitude unthought of in modern times, and we all realize it is necessary to raise 
every dollar of additional revenue that can be raised without seriously disturbing or shattering 
our national economy.”7 
The justices, of course, are not in a position to adopt revenue-raising laws or directly 
seize property for the nation’s wartime efforts, but they are able to render decisions in a manner 
that systematically favors the government in cases and controversies that implicate the fiscal pie 
in times of war, thereby indirectly providing economic assistance to the nation in times of need.  
This book aims to convince readers that the justices use cases such as Court Holding and 
Cumberland to advance not only their own, but the nation’s goals--providing access to economic 
resources, when necessary, to increase the probability of success on the battlefield.  In short, the 
thesis of the book is that Supreme Court justices (as well as lower federal court judges) hold an 
implicit power of the purse, a power that can be used to realize extra-legal and budget-related 
objectives.   
Not surprisingly, quite a few scholars have documented the manner in which Congress 
and the president have dealt with fiscal issues in wartime emergencies,8 but the extant literature 
is virtually silent on the financial role of the federal courts in times of crises.  Students of the 
judiciary, to be sure, have investigated legal challenges to emergency funding measures, such as 
property seizures, banking regulations, and excess profits taxes, and have noted courtroom 
disputes enable judges both to support and derail economic policy,9 but the literature has failed 
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to explore the possibility that judges are in a position to engage in revenue raising and spending 
polices in their own right.  More to the point, scholars have not identified federal judges as fiscal 
actors positioned to influence the size and use of the federal budget.   
A handful of scholars in both law and political science have explored federal judges’ 
ability to affect state and local funding decisions and more than thirty years ago, the legal scholar 
Gerold Frug aptly characterized a series of federal judicial mandates as an exercise of the 
“judicial power of the purse” given that courts were able to force state and local governments to 
spend public funds on certain activities, irrespective of their own preferences or those of their 
constituents.10  The title of this book, of course, derives from Frug’s early and important insight 
vis-à-vis judicial powers.  The substance of this study, however, moves far beyond Frug’s 
descriptive point and demonstrates that judges are able both to raise and spend federal monies 
irrespective of the preferences of the other two branches of government.  Federal judges, in short 
may not have the formal power of the purse (it lies with Congress), but, as evidenced in the 
chapters that follow, they nevertheless can--and do--systematically exercise control over a 
surprising portion of the federal budget. 
Uncovering and describing federal judges’ roles in the national budgetary process charts 
new territory, but it also raises two important questions:  Do judges have any penchant to employ 
their fiscal authority in times of crisis, thereby increasing the nation’s ability to adequately 
respond to perceived threats?  If so, do judges in fact use their budgetary powers differently in 
times of crisis than in periods of relative calm?  This study seeks to answer to these inquiries 
through the lens of emergencies brought about by military threats or attacks from abroad.  Stated 
most directly, the book sets aside the interesting questions that emerge in the context of domestic 
emergencies and focuses on the exercise of judicial purse powers in times of foreign policy 
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crises.  For the sake of clarity, foreign policy crises, as defined here, are emergencies that raise 
national defense issues associated with military safety and security, but not issues that implicate 
nonmilitary foreign aid, diplomatic and trade relationships, and so forth.11   
 
The Plan of the Book and Its Place in the Extant Literature 
To investigate if, how, and when judges use their fiscal powers, this book sets forth an 
information theory of crisis jurisprudence, a theory that posits rational judges, like individuals 
and policymakers generally, prefer periods of safety and security to those plagued by danger and 
chaos.  Given this preference, judges are likely to render decisions in the cases and controversies 
that show up on their dockets in a manner calculated to keep the nation safe.  Preparing and 
readying the nation for possible engagement in military hostilities is an extremely costly 
endeavor and, thus, the information theory argues that instrumentally rational judges will seek to 
enable the nation to fend off foreign threats through the strategic use of their purse strings.   
Judges, of course, are experts in legal and constitutional matters, and not foreign policy 
matters, and thus will have difficulty identifying foreign policy crises, yet they will want to 
deploy their decision-making powers to help fund national defense in dangerous times.  
Consequently, the information theory posits that judges will take judicial notice, perhaps sub 
silencio, of credible cues emerging from the elected branches of government vis-à-vis the 
perceived existence of foreign policy crises.  These cues can take a range of different forms, such 
as a congressional declaration of war, a major troop deployment by the executive branch, or the 
conscription of men into the army in preparation for military engagement.  The important 
theoretical point made below is not the specific cue relied upon, but the idea that judges will look 
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to experts for purposes of determining the existence of a foreign policy crisis, and not their own 
perceived expertise or that of the parties litigating before them.   
The cues received by the courts will generally contain consistent messages (that is, both 
Congress and the president will take action indicating a crisis either exists or it does not exist), 
and in these circumstances judges will have no difficulty discerning the presence or absence of a 
foreign policy crisis.  It is possible, however, that the elected branches will convey contradictory 
messages: Congress may refuse to support the president’s decision to deploy troops by 
withholding funds or through some other formal and public mechanism, suggesting the two 
bodies of government have diverging views on whether a foreign policy crisis is at hand.  In this 
context, judges must assess the credibility of the messages and, in effect, side with one branch, or 
the other, on the question.  For a number of reasons outlined below including the long-standing 
judicial deference to legislative actions in times of foreign policy crises--but not necessarily to 
those undertaken by the executive branch--the information theory of crisis jurisprudence posits 
that judges will often trust cues emanating from Congress over those sent by the president when 
they are at odds and when the nation’s finances are implicated. 
The president, as the nation’s commander-in-chief, certainly has valuable information 
and expertise in the foreign policy context.  The political scientist Aaron Wildavsky proposed the 
“two presidencies thesis” more than forty years ago arguing that policymakers systematically 
support the executive branch in the foreign policy arena given the president’s foreign policy 
information, knowledge and experience, but not in the domestic context where the two branches 
are assumed to be on equal footing.12  More recently, the legal scholars Eric Posner and Adrian 
Vermeule have focused specifically on federal courts and have made a strong case for federal 
judicial deference to the president’s foreign policy choices on grounds similar to Wildavsky’s 
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two presidencies thesis.13 The information theory presented and empirically investigated below, 
however, is not in conflict with the idea that judges and policymakers should or do privilege 
presidential cues on specific wartime policies because it is a theory that addresses judges’ use of 
their budgetary powers in periods of crises more generally--not their decisions on individual and 
specific policy choices.  Indeed, the cases and controversies that allow judges to operate as fiscal 
agents often do not involve military matters at all, but routine disputes in taxation and other 
financial areas of the law.  The information theory posits that court-induced financial assistance 
is apt to emerge when Congress and the president send consistent cues indicating that the 
nation’s safety and security are threatened.  If the president is supportive of increased levels of 
defense but Congress is silent or even opposed to military action, courts are unlikely to offer a 
funding boost on the grounds that military success does not depend on it.   
The information theory of crisis jurisprudence does not imply that when federal judges 
choose to act, they will always attempt to loosen budgetary constraints in an effort to enable the 
nation to consume greater levels of defense.  Rather this new understanding of the courts posits 
that judges will deploy the judicial power of the purse both negatively and positively.  More 
specifically, judges will support the government in times of crisis by rendering decisions that 
expand the fisc when they believe extant safety and security are inadequate and thus greater 
levels of defense are necessary to protect the nation’s interests.  But if judges receive trustworthy 
cues indicating that current policy has gone astray in the sense that military activities have 
become excessive--courts will seek to tighten the fisc by siding with private parties in litigation 
and against the government, thereby forcing the latter to make unwanted payouts and limiting the 
amount of public funds available for continued military endeavors.  In these circumstances, 
judges will seek to shrink the size of the fiscal pie in order to promote their desire for the optimal 
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level of defense spending.  To see why judges are likely to adopt this strategy, consider a 
situation in which Congress formally repeals its prior support for a president’s wartime activities 
and reduces funds available for defense generally.  In this scenario, judges are likely to employ 
their powers in a manner also intended to squeeze the budget and, in the process, implement 
judicial incentives for the president and his advisors to reconsider their course of action and 
possibly reduce the level of military activity perceived to be excessive.   
The information theory, in short, focuses on the trade-off that judges routinely face 
between “all other goods” (such as law, policy, institutional stability, personal legacy, and so 
forth) and “safety and security.”  Judges seek the ideal level of defense but must rely on the cues 
and signals emanating from the elected branches of government to determine whether extant 
levels are too high or too low.  When they receive credible information that defense levels are 
insufficient to keep the nation safe, they will trade off all other goods for more defense; if they 
receive cues indicating defense levels have become disproportionate to the amount needed for 
safety and security, they will decide cases in a manner that enables greater consumption of the 
other desired goods, such as law and ideology.  Absent such cues, judges will issue opinions that 
reflect their belief that current defense levels are optimal and thus they need not increase nor 
shrink the size of the budget:  the ideal bundle of goods is already being consumed.  
This study builds on the extant literature in that it conceptualizes judges as instrumentally 
rational actors seeking to implement individual preferences over a range of goods, but it also 
presents a new understanding of the courts.  Judicial scholars have long theorized and 
investigated the role of microlevel factors, such as the facts of a case, specific laws, and judicial 
political preferences (identified as “all other goods” above).  Far less attention has been paid to 
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macrolevel factors in judicial decision-making and no study has provided an explicit model of 
judges’ willingness to utilize their budgetary authority in times of national danger. 
To be sure, legal and political science researchers have not entirely ignored macrolevel 
factors and their effects on the judicial decision-making process.  In two recent and important 
contributions to the literature, the legal scholar Barry Friedman and the team of political 
scientists, James Gibson and Gregory Caldeira, have noted that judges account for the political 
and social environments when rendering decisions on important issues in order to maintain a 
certain level of popularity and public acceptance.14  As well, Robert Erickson, Michael 
MacKuen, and James Stimson have investigated the effects of political and economic trends on 
courts by devising a measure that simultaneously incorporates features of both in their important 
and path-breaking book, The Macro Polity.  This study, unlike the existing literature, however, 
posits that judges account for the broader environment not to maintain legitimacy and popular 
support--but rather to shape national policy in ways that accord with their own preferences.   
More on point are the studies that investigate the effects of macrolevel events, such as 
foreign policy crises, on federal courts.  Numerous legal and political science researchers have 
explored these effects, including Lee Epstein, Daniel Ho, Gary King, and Jeffrey Segal, Richard 
Posner, Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Bruce Ackerman, Mark Tushnet, and Justice William 
Rehnquist,15 and all have made important and noteworthy contributions to the literature.  
Because each of these studies, as well as many others, advances our understanding of judging in 
times of foreign policy crisis, it is worthwhile to investigate briefly just how this book builds 
upon and extends this literature.  
Beginning with the chief similarities.  The contributions to the literature just listed, like 
this one, explore the reality that foreign policy crises exert an influence on the judicial decision-
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making process.  Moreover, the existing studies, taken together, like this one, present a range of 
both qualitative and quantitative evidence, documenting how, why, and when judges are likely to 
privilege the views of the federal government vis-à-vis private parties during on-going military 
crises.  These commonalities exist, but important differences also distinguish this book from 
existing studies on a number of fronts.  
First and foremost, scholars investigating judging in times of foreign policy crisis, 
including those listed above, have explored whether judges do or should decide civil rights and 
liberties cases differently in times of peace than in periods when the nation is in peril.  Put 
differently, scholars have devoted their time and energy to understanding what might be labeled 
the judicial policing hand--they investigate whether judges should or do make trade-offs between 
individual rights and liberties, on the one hand, and law and order, on the other, in times of crisis.  
As must be obvious by now, this study investigates the judicial fiscal hand in order to identify 
and understand judges’ financial role in fending off military threats from abroad.  Scholars have 
entirely ignored the idea that judges operate as federal fiscal actors seeking to assure the country 
consumes the optimal level of defense, thereby assuring necessary trade-offs between safety and 
security and “all other goods.”   
Second, this book develops a theoretical basis for why we should expect judges to 
respond to foreign policy crises, and perhaps more importantly, why judges will rationally 
employ their decision-making power as a double-edged sword when pursuing their preferences.  
To be sure, hints of the information theory of crisis jurisprudence presented here have emerged 
in the literature, but scholars have all focused on one side or the other of the judicial sword, or on 
normative rather than positive considerations.  No scholar to date has attempted to flesh out a 
complete theory of the federal courts in times of a foreign policy crises, nor have scholars 
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attempted to clarify just how such a theory is able to accommodate and build upon the long-
standing court scholarship focusing on microlevel factors, such as facts, law and judicial 
ideology.  From a theoretical perspective, then, this book seeks both to organize and advance our 
understanding of judging in periods of crises and in times of peace.  
Third, this book investigates the empirical implications of the information theory with 
data that is quite a bit different than that used in the extant literature.  With few exceptions,16 the 
literature has focused almost exclusively on judicial decision-making at the apex of the judicial 
hierarchy:  the U.S. Supreme Court.  This study, by contrast, investigates the Supreme Court as 
well as the lower federal courts in times of crisis.  While the Supreme Court is arguably the most 
important body in the judicial system given that the justices nearly always resolve issues of 
national significance and at the same time render opinions with great precedential value, lower 
federal courts also undeniably play a key role in judicial decision-making given the large number 
of decisions they render every year and their ability to flout Supreme Court doctrine, at least at 
the margin.  Moreover, existing studies tend to focus on narrow time frames or unique periods in 
court history, whereas this study investigates thousands of judicial decisions rendered by both the 
Supreme Court from 1900-2010 and in federal appellate courts from 1925-2002, enabling far 
more detailed analyses of military crises than heretofore attempted.17.  
 
Why Investigate the Information Theory of Crisis Jurisprudence Through the Narrow Lens of 
Foreign Policy Crises? 
Turning now to the specific focus of this book:  judges as fiscal actors in times of foreign 
policy crises.  One might ask why it is useful to set forth and investigate an information theory of 
crisis jurisprudence through the lens of foreign policy crises, and not crises more generally.  In 
	   12	  
short, why not conduct a far more expansive and comprehensive study with military crises as just 
one component of a larger investigation?  To answer to these questions, consider the following.   
A large extant literature investigates how the federal government--all three branches--
responds to foreign policy crises, but no study has sought to identify the judicial power of the 
purse or to document just how these financial powers are used to facilitate the nation’s military 
success in times of crisis.  This study, then, aims to fill a surprising and unfortunate gap in the 
literature, and in doing so, seeks to expand not only our current understanding of judicial 
preferences, but also to illustrate the manner in which judges interact with and possibly influence 
the other two branches of government.  This latter insight is important:  scholars have generally 
sought to identify the means by which Congress and the president seek to influence judicial 
decision-making, but this study seeks to flip the causal arrow, demonstrating that judges will 
seek to influence the policymaking that unfolds and transpires in the elected branches of 
government.  Whether judges successfully transform the policymaking choices of Congress and 
the president is an empirical question that is not addressed here--rather the point is that judges 
will act as if they are able to exert such influence. 
The information theory of crisis jurisprudence can (and should and will) be investigated 
in a range of different crisis contexts, but it is worthwhile to flesh out and scrutinize this new 
theory in the milieu in which it is likely to have the greatest purchase:  foreign policy crises.  
These crises are truly national events, posing a threat to the country’s interests and, perhaps, its 
very survival, while at the same time inflicting considerable costs on the public fisc.  For these 
reasons, military crises involving high-risk situations are likely to take priority in policymaking 
circles, perhaps, in part, because the incidents tend to have homogenous effects throughout the 
nation in the sense that we have never observed one part of the country at war while another is at 
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peace.  Due to this experiential homogeneity, it is reasonable to expect that these crises will also 
have largely homogenous effects on judges all around the nation and up-and-down the judicial 
hierarchy, if they are affected at all.  Of course, the local nature of military casualties and defense 
industry profits may lead to larger (or smaller) effects on courts located in different regions of 
the country, but these factors do not change the underlying idea that a major military event will 
affect court outcomes throughout the country given the high stakes in every jurisdiction.  
Issues involving domestic crises, such as natural disasters, crime waves, major economic 
downturns, and other types of macrolevel events, by contrast, can have national effects but are 
more likely to be contained to relatively narrow regions.  In fact, data suggest that regional 
differences in many of these circumstances persist over time, and that different localities (even 
within the same state) often experience events quite a bit differently from the national average.  
To give just one example, hurricanes are far more likely strike in the Eastern and Middle parts of 
the Southern U.S., but are unlikely to affect the Pacific Northwest.  Given the local nature of 
natural disasters such as hurricanes, it is doubtful that they will exert a strong influence on the 
average federal judge who is likely to have very little--or no--information about the event or its 
costs to the federal budget.  Whether the information theory, or a macrotheory of the court more 
generally, could accommodate such issues is intriguing and certainly worthy of future 
consideration, but these issues will be investigated in a follow-up project rather than here.  
The notion that foreign policy crises pose distinct and all-encompassing threats to the 
nation as whole does not, of course, originate with this study.  Judges, themselves, have 
suggested as much.  In Yakus v. U.S., for example, the Supreme Court considered a dispute 
involving wartime price controls implemented in the 1940s.  The justices issued a series of 
opinions in Yakus implying that the on-going wartime crisis was reason enough to sanction the 
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new laws--even if a different view would likely prevail in peacetime.  In the words of Justice 
Rutledge, who questioned the law’s procedural aspects but not the government’s substantive 
decision on price controls: 
 
Judged by normal peacetime standards, over-all nationwide price control hardly has an 
accepted place in our institutions . . . Whether control so extensive might be upheld in 
some emergency not created by war need not now be decided.  That it can be supported 
in the present circumstances and for the declared purposes there can be no doubt.18 
 
The justices are not alone in their view that foreign policy crises, such as wars, create unique 
circumstances warranting extraordinary federal actions often at great expense to the budget.  As 
the legal and political science scholar Edward Corwin noted in his well-known work Total War 
and the Constitution, “war, public war, total war, is still no doubt the emergency par 
excellence”19 and this, in turn, justifies government intervention of a sort and level unseen, and 
perhaps, undesirable in times of peace.20   
Consider other the views also emanating from the political science literature.  A 
prevailing view in the realist school of international relations posits that because the international 
system is plagued by a great level of competition and danger, a nation’s top priority is (and must 
be) its security and survival.21  This preference leads many realists to make strong claims about 
foreign versus domestic policymaking:  while the latter is rife with conflicting viewpoints, 
partisan politics, and regional disagreements, the former is characterized by unanimity and 
accord given the high-stakes involved.22  Scholars subscribing to this view of realism have 
investigated these contrasting dynamics in the context of Congress and have noted that in times 
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of foreign policy crises, legislators rationally offer bipartisan support for the president to assure a 
successful resolution of the issues, thereby facilitating national safety and security.  While a 
number of recent scholars, including William Howell, Jon Pevehouse, David Rohde, and John 
Tierney convincingly challenge to the realists’ assertion that partisan politics dissolve in times of 
crisis,23 no scholar or team of scholars has questioned the underlying claim that resolving foreign 
policy crises is a top priority in policymaking circles given the risks involved.  Similarly, this 
study of the federal courts posits that foreign and military crises weigh heavily on the judicial 
mind given the severe national consequences of failure; to disregard crises is to jeopardize not 
only the well-being of the judges and the judiciary, but the whole nation.  
Similarly, the idea underlying the “rally-around-the-flag effect” is linked to the unique 
nature of international and foreign policy events.  Rally events, as defined by the political 
scientist John Mueller are specific, dramatic, and sharply focused international events involving 
the United States and the president in particular, and lead to sudden and substantial increases in 
presidential approval ratings.24  Rally events that have sparked notable and increased popularity 
rating include the on-set of the Korean War, the Iranian hostage crisis, and the concerted attacks 
on the nation that occurred on 9/11.  The precise cause of the rally-around-the-flag effect is 
disputed; some argue they are associated with patriotic feelings that Americans experience in 
times of danger while others argue they are linked to political leaders’ willingness refrain from 
publicly criticizing the commander-in-chief during an on-going foreign crisis.  Irrespective of the 
underlying cause, again there is no dispute that international and foreign policy crises are unique 
incidents in American history involving high-stake issues that generate popular views 
unobserved in times of domestic crises or other macrolevel events.  Similarly, this study expects 
federal judges to respond to foreign policy crises in a way that differs from the decision-making 
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that transpires in periods of domestic disorder and peacetime generally--they will decide cases in 
a manner that enables the nation to purchase the preferred levels of defense. 
There is one final reason why foreign policy crises are well-suited for an initial 
investigation of the effects of macrolevel events on courts--they impose massive costs on the 
nation and thus it is reasonable to expect that judges will deploy their fiscal authority in a manner 
intended to aid the nation’s financial needs in these periods.  While many of the costs are 
incommensurable and difficult to estimate, such as the suppression of individual rights and 
liberties, human suffering, and death; other costs, such as direct expenditures on military 
equipment, training, and deployment, can be calculated with some precision.  Since the turn of 
the twentieth century, for example, U.S. policymakers have spent nearly $12,700,000 billion 
defending the nation from military threats abroad, an average of $115,000 billion every year (all 
numbers here and below are in 2009 dollars unless indicated otherwise).  As the legal academics 
Steven Bank, Kirk Stark, and Joseph Thorndike have noted in their excellent history of fiscal 
policymaking in times of emergency:  wartime activities engender sheer necessity. “There is 
simply no other government activity that requires as much revenue,” the authors argue, “as 
fighting a war.  Success on the battlefield requires economic resources [and the nation must find 
a way] to marshal those resources.”25 
These military costs, of course, have not been constant throughout all time periods, an 
empirical fact that will play an important role in both the theory and empirical findings presented 
below.  In the first half of the twentieth century, defense outlays spiked in both world wars and 
then returned to near-peacetime levels at the end of each foreign policy crisis.  Between 1900 
and 1916, for example, the government spent an average of $266 million on military activities, 
but mean spending in 1917 and 1918 was $3,383 million, the years when the nation was involved 
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in World War I.  Similarly, the government invested $1,029 million on average between 1920 
and 1940, but incurred roughly $52,180 million in expenses on average every year during World 
War II on defense operations.   
This defense expenditure cycle--from high levels in times of foreign crises to low levels 
during peacetime and then back again--was the norm up through World War II, but after that 
time the cycle began to fade as military costs remained high and relatively constant in all years.  
This is not because the nation avoided serious foreign policy crises after World War II--the 
Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, the Afghanistan War, and the Iraq War--all prove 
otherwise.  Rather the high and constant military costs are attributable to policymakers’ choice to 
devote substantial funds to military activities in all periods, at least in part, to assure the nation’s 
ability and readiness to respond to any and all military hostilities as the cold war unfolded.   
Table 1 below depicts the costs incurred by the nation in the years it was involved in 
“major wars” throughout the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, totaling more than $6 
trillion above what the nation would have incurred in military expenses absent a foreign policy 
crisis.  World War II cost the nation more than $4 trillion and is, by far, the most expensive 
foreign policy crisis to date; the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars have led the government to spend 
close to $1 trillion in public funds; while the other wars involved expenditures of far less monies:  
$686 billion (Vietnam War), $253 billion (World War I), $320 billion (Korean War), and $96 
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Table 1 
The financial costs of major U.S. wartime activity since 1900 
 
War Period of Active U.S. 
Involvement 
 
Cost in Billions 
of 2009 U.S. Dollars 
World War I 1917-1919 $253 
World War II 1941-1945 $4,114 
Korean War 1950-1953 $320 
Vietnam War 1964-1972 $686 
Gulf War 1990-1991 $96 
War on Terror 2001-present $859 
Total Costs  $6,328 
Source: Cost of Major U.S. Wars, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, July 
2008 available at http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/costs_of_major_us_wars.htm 	  	  
Table 1 informs on the cost of major wars, but it is misleading in two important respects.  
First, when the nation employs the military draft, as it did during the two world wars and the 
Korean and Vietnam Wars, recruits are paid below-market wages and thus the costs depicted in 
table 1 indicate actual outlays but substantially understate social costs.  Second, the table ignores 
defense costs incurred by the nation in the absence of major military deployments.  Accordingly, 
figure 1 below presents military spending in real dollars and as a proportion of the GDP, which 
addresses the second problem but the not the first.  The dotted line in the figure depicts outlays in 
billions of 2009 dollars and is linked to the y-axis on the right-hand side of the figure; the solid 
line presents defense outlays as a proportion of the GDP and is linked to the y-axis on the left-
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Figure 1 
Defense outlays, 1910-2010  	  	  
	  	  
Note:  Solid line represents total defense outlays in billion of 2009 dollars and dashed line depicts 
defense spending as percent of GDP. 
 
Figure 1 suggests that major wars are often, but not always, correlated with high levels of 
defense expenditures.  World War I, World II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the 
Iraq/Afghanistan Wars all led to a spike in defense spending as represented in constant dollars 
and as a portion of the GDP.   The spike in spending correlated with the Vietnam War, however, 
did not take place until the late 1960s notwithstanding the fact that the war is widely believed to 
have begun as early as 1963 when Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution supporting 
President Johnson’s military activities in Indochina; perhaps even more notable, real defense 
spending decreased several times during this wartime period as did defense spending as a 
proportion of GDP--suggesting that neither Congress nor the president were prioritizing the 
Vietnam War in their appropriations and spending decisions.  Moreover, spending increased 
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and yet there were no major troop deployments on the scale of those observed during the 
wartime periods.  Finally, real defense spending increased sharply in the early twentieth century 
and has continued to increase throughout the Iraq/Afghanistan Wars, but has increased only a 
small amount vis-à-vis the GDP during this time period.   
While figure 1 and table 1 both indicate that defense activities are costly, the nation also 
spends substantial monies responding to various other macrolevel events, such as natural 
disasters, economic downturns, crime, immigration, and so forth.  Unlike defense activities, 
however, these expenditures are not widely and routinely publicized in the media, extensively 
discussed in academic scholarship, or analyzed as unique budgetary items in policymaking 
circles.  Indeed, identifying the costs of major military crises, and defense spending generally, is 
an easy task given that they are listed separately in the annual federal budget, which is made 
widely available by the government in print publications and on internet sites.  The federal costs 
associated with domestic crises and other macrolevel events, by contrast, are not aggregated nor 
estimated in any single location and, with few exceptions, are virtually impossible to identify 
with any precision given that agency protocols do not require these costs to be singled out in the 
budget reporting process.  These differences in budgeting practices, again, increase the 
likelihood that federal judges will strategically employ their budgetary powers to help the nation 
fund emergency costs brought about by foreign policy crises but not other types of crises or 
large-scale events that plague the nation.   
 
The Organization of the Book 
This book is organized as follows.  Chapter 1 uncovers and describes the judicial power 
of the purse from the perspective of each branch of government.  With the help of published data 
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and interviews with various current and former government officials, the chapter establishes the 
possible upper and lower bound of judicial fiscal power, thereby setting the groundwork for an 
investigation of how this budgetary authority is exercised in times of foreign policy crises.   
Chapter 2 sets forth the information theory of crisis jurisprudence positing that judges 
wield their fiscal power as a double-edged sword with the goal of assuring the nation consumes 
the preferred level of defense.  When military spending is perceived to be insufficient (perhaps 
due to unforeseen military threats from abroad) judges will employ their purse powers with the 
intent of expanding the size of the fisc and enabling consumption of greater levels of defense; 
when judges perceive defense spending to be excessive, they will seek to pinch the fisc in an 
effort to reduce the military activities undertaken by Congress and the president.  Having neither 
information nor expertise with respect to foreign policy issues, judges will have difficulty 
determining whether they (and the nation) should trade-off consumption of “all other goods” for 
greater levels of defense and for this reason they will rely on cues and signals emanating from 
the elected branches.  When these cues are consistent, judges will have no difficulty discerning 
whether the nation needs more or less defense to maintain the optimal level of safety and 
security, but when Congress and the president send conflicting messages judges must side with 
one branch over the other on the issue at hand.  The information theory hypothesizes that judges 
will often side with Congress over the president when it comes to decision-making in times of 
crisis for a number reasons suggested above and explored in detail below. 
Chapter 3 conducts a large-N quantitative study of judicial decision-making and finds 
substantial support for the information theory of crisis jurisprudence in the context of the 
Supreme Court but not the lower federal appellate courts.  More specifically, the findings show 
that during World Wars I and II, the justices systematically sought to augment the size of the 
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fisc, but after that period, judicial strategies became substantially more complex.  Major troop 
deployments led the justices to markedly disfavor the government throughout the cold war 
period yet during this same time, the justices favored the government if defense spending 
increased.  These twin findings in the cold war era suggest that the justices were willing to aid 
the nation financially when the elected branches of government devoted more of the nation’s 
financial resources to its military activities, but when Congress and the president failed to 
identify defense as a priority in their own spending choices--the Court was apt to refuse to help 
fund the military efforts--indeed, they were apt to tighten the fisc as a means to encourage the 
government to reconsider its foreign policy tactics.  Chapter 4 turns to qualitative evidence found 
in judicial opinions, courtroom filings, and law clerks’ memoranda and uncovers data that 
substantially mirror the quantitative findings presented in chapter 3.  The qualitative evidence 
indicates that judges are not only aware of the high financial costs of war, but will eagerly utilize 
their decision-making powers to enable the nation to purchase increasing levels of defense but 
only when it appears necessary for success on the battlefield.  
The information theory of crisis jurisprudence presented here, along with its empirical 
implications, establish the groundwork for additional research exploring the effects of crises on 
federal courts in contexts well beyond foreign policy emergencies.  These crises might include 
economic, health, or crime issues, or may concern natural disasters, but all would involve events 
beyond control of either the litigants or the judges.  The book, in short, invites further 
investigation of how national issues--macrolevel issues--outside the foreign policy context affect 
courts.  To explore this possibility, chapter 5 conducts an out-of-sample study of decision-
making in one domestic context--economic policymaking.  This preliminary study finds the 
information theory, with minor adjustments, substantially aids in forecasting how and why 
	   23	  
judges respond to macroeconomic trends.  The theory suggests, and the data confirm, that 
Supreme Court justices perceive the state of the economy as a credible cue of federal 
policymakers’ ability to manage the nation’s resources: when the economy is doing well, the 
justices tend to support the government in the decision-making process but as the economy turns 
sour this support evaporates and the justices begin issuing increased levels of anti-government 
decisions in financial cases that show up on the docket.  This “judicial business cycle” 
corresponds to the typical macroeconomic upturns and downturns, but with the onset of a serious 
economic contraction--such as the Great Depression in the 1930s--the justices are more likely to 
collaborate with federal policymakers rather than punish them for extant economic conditions.  
The book owes a debt to the literatures in both international relations and judicial 
decision-making.  Accordingly, the concluding chapter offers a brief summary of the extant 
scholarship and explores how the information theory and the empirical findings presented here 
build upon and extend the current literatures in these areas.  Finally, the chapter closes with a 
short discussion of the normative implications of the judicial inclination to employ the implicit 
judicial power of the purse in times of crisis to advance judges’ and the nation’s goals. 
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